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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF CASE
This is an action brought by plaintiffs-appellants,
as lessors, pursuant to the forcible

entry and detainer

statute (Chapter 36, Title 78, U.C.A.), for certain alleged
violations of a written lease agreement.

The lessees (defen-

dants-respondents) counterclaimed for violation of the
covenant of quiet and peaceful possession, for malicious
prosecution, attorney's fees and punitive damages.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint
and three of defendant Nikols' counts in his counterclaim,
awarded attorney's fees to defendant Nikols pursuant to
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- 2Count III of his counterclaim in the amount of $3,665.63,
plus costs, and awarded to defendants DAB Associates, George
Anagnostakis, George Bruce Breinholt and Welden L. Daines
attorney's fees in the amount of $3,175, plus $613.01 for
food and services supplied to plaintiffs' customers.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant Nikols prays the judgment be affirmed
except in the following respects, which should be reversed
as error:

(1) the trial court's denial of defendant's

Motion to Dismiss based upon waiver, collateral estoppel and
res judicata; (2) the trial court's denial of defendant's
Motion to Dismiss for defective notice; (3) the trial court's
dismissal of Nikols' counterclaim against plaintiffs for
violation of the covenant of peaceful and quiet possession.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The "Statement of Facts" in plaintiffs' brief contains so much irrelevant material that defendant Nikols is
compelled to state the facts accurately.
Plaintiffs are lessees of certain real property
located in Salt Lake County which is improved and on which
they operate the Salt Lake Athletic Club.

Plaintiffs sub-

leased to defendant Nikols or or about December 1, 1971, a
portion of the premises which they lease.

The material

portions of the sublease (Ex. 13-P) are as follows:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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- 34. Use of Premises. Heretofore Sublessor has prepared and served food and
beverages on the above-described premises
in operating the Towne House Athletic Club
thereon. Sublessee assumes the operation
of preparing and serving such food and
beverages to the members of the said Club
in the main dining room and kitchen area.
Sublessee shall have such use of the premises as shall be reasonable and desirable
to facilitate the preparation and dispensing
of such foods and beverages. Sublessee
shall use said premises strictly in accord
with all applicable federal, state and
local laws, rules and ordinances.
5. Scope of Operation. Sublessee
shall have available and prepare and
serve to members of the said Club on
the premises food and beverages in the
types and qualities presently being
served and shall serve the same on the
days and hours when the same are presently available. Food and beverages
are served on the days and at the times
as follows:
Lunch

Monday through Friday
11:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m.

Dinner

Saturday
7:30 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.

In addition, Sublessee shall have sandwiches
and drinks available Monday through Saturday
from 6:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.
Sublessee may offer additional service as he, in his sole discretion, shall
determine.

9. Opening to Public. Sublessor and
Sublessee agree that if in Sublessee's
opinion after assuming the operations on
the premises, there is not sufficient food
and beverage business from the Club members to make such business profitable for

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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- 4Sublessee, then Sublessee may open the
premises to the public and make the same
a public restaurant. In such event, however, Sublessee shall change the name of
said restaurant so that it will not be
identified as a part of the Towne House
Athletic Club.

16. Default and Termination. If
sublessee fails to pay any rent when it
is due or within thirty (30) days after
written notice of such failure, Sublessor
shall have a lien on Sublessee's personal
property on said premises and may bring
suit for recovery of the leased premises
and/or to recover judgment for any or all
delinquent installments including court
and other costs and attorneys fees.

,L r *

1

Sublessor and Sublessee agree that if
either defaults in any of the conditions and
terms of this lease, the defaulting party
shall pay all costs and expenses, including
attorney fees, which may arise or accrue
from enforcing this lease or in obtaining
possession of the premises or in pursuing
any remedy provided by the laws of the
State of Utah whether by filing suit or
otherwise.
On or about January 7, 1974, Nikols subleased the

restaurant premises to DAB Associates, who thereafter operated Aggie's Club and Restaurant on the premises.

Each of

the lease provisions in the Stevensen-Nikols lease described
above is identical in the Nikols-DAB Associates lease. DAB
Associates expanded the operation and holds a Class "C" beer
license issued by Salt Lake City (Ex. 12-P).

DAB Associates

also has a food and sanitary permit issued by the Salt Lake
City-County Health Department for a restaurant, cabaret and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 5Class "C" beer operation (Ex. 10-P).

On or about the 4th

day of June, 1974, the defendants Nick N. Nikols and DAB
Associates were served with a summons and complaint by the
plaintiffs Olaf Theodore Stevensen and Barbara Ann Stevensen,
in Civil No. 219945, in the District Court of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.

In that action, the plaintiffs made

the following allegations:
4. By the terms of said principal
sublease, defendant Nick N. Nikols covenanted that he would not allow any liens
to be placed against the premises. Defendant Nikols has allowed a lien to be
placed against the premises and has not
discharged the same.
F

5. By the terms of said principal
sublease, defendant Nick N. Nikols assumed
the operation of preparing and serving
food and beverages to the members of said
club. Defendant Nikols and his subtenant
have required Towne House members to pay a
cover charge for use of the restaurant
facilities and have thereby violated the
terms of said principal sublease.
6. By the terms of said principal
sublease, defendant Nick N. Nikols assumed
the operation of preparing and serving
food and beverages to members of the Club.
Defendant Nikols and his subtenants refused to allow minor members of the Towne
House Club to use the restaurant facilities on occasion and have thereby violated
the terms of said principal sublease.

8. By the terms of said principal
sublease, defendant Nick N. Nikols was
required to prepare and serve to members
of the Club food and beverages in the
types and qualities served by plaintiffs
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when they operated the Club. Defendant
Nikols and his subtenant have failed to
provide the same quality of food and service previously supplied to members.

p
1
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9. By the terms of said principal
. . sublease, in the event there was insuffi- ,r
$xk c i e n t f00(j and beverage business from
Club members, defendant was permitted
, ... ,%
to open the premises to the public and
make the same a public restaurant. Defendant Nikols and his subtenant have
opened the premises but have failed to
operate the same as a public restaurant.
\ ' Thereafter, rent for the months of June and July
were paid by defendants and received and accepted by plaintiffs.

The Court, upon defendants1 Motion for Summary

Judgment, held that the defendants were entitled to judgment
as a matter of law and dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint
with prejudice (R. 320).
.-' On or about the 26th day of August, 1974, the
defendants were served with plaintiffs' Notice to Cure
Default or Quit (Ex. 5-P). On or about the 5th day of
September, 1974, the plaintiff served the defendants with a
Notice to Quit the leased premises (Ex. 4-P). Subsequently,
on or about the 12th day of September, 1974, the plaintiffs
filed their complaint in the instant action in the Third
District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

The

Notice to Quit, Notice to Cure Default or Quit and the
complaint set forth identical alleged breaches of the lease.
The complaint in the instant action includes five claimed
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 7 breaches of the lease which were included in the complaint
in the prior civil action.

Those claims which are repeated

are in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, and 10 of the complaint (R. 238
Plaintiffs' action is based upon the unlawful
detainer statute, Section 78-36-1, et seq., Utah Code Annotated,

In paragraphs 12 and 13 of the complaint, plaintiffs

made specific reference to the unlawful detainer statute,
78-36-3(5), Utah Code Annotated, and stated the following in
paragraph 15 of said complaint:
As a result of defendants1 failure to cure
said defaults and pay rent, they are in
unlawful detainer of the leased premises
and plaintiffs are entitled to an order
from the court evicting defendants from
the leased premises and restoring the
possession of the same to plaintiffs.
In the prayer of the complaint, the plaintiffs asked for
treble damages, as provided in the unlawful detainer statute.
Defendant Nikols moved for dismissal of the action
because of the bar of res judicata and collateral estoppel
(R. 276). After a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the
trial court denied the motion (R.305).
At the commencement of the trial, the defendants
again moved for dismissal of the plaintiffs1 complaint.

The

motion was based upon the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel (R. 4-5), and that the notices served
upon the defendants were defective (R. 6). The motion to
dismiss based upon res judicata and collateral estoppel was
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- 8 denied (R. 4-5), and the motion based upon defective notice
was taken under advisement and is deemed denied in the
Court's judgment because no specified ruling was made thereon.
On the 31st day of January, 1975, judgment was
entered by the Honorable Peter F. Leary, District Judge of
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State
of Utah.

Counts I, II and IV of Nikols1 counterclaim were

dismissed, no cause of action.

Nikols was awarded attor-

ney's fees based upon Count III of his counterclaim, the
second paragraph of which count reads in material part as
follows:

1

t
;•*, 3 |)

2. By virtue of the provisions of
paragraph 16 of the sublease agreement,
Exhibit "A" to Plaintiffs' Complaint, this
Defendant is entitled to recover attorney's f ]
fees in connection with the defense of
this action. This defendant is unable to
allege the amount of such attorney's fees
because that will depend upon the extent
of the work necessary to be performed by
his legal counsel . . . .
(Emphasis added.)
(R. 335.)
On the 24th day of February, 1975, 24 days after

entry of the judgment, plaintiffs filed their notice of
appeal from the judgment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO HEAR
POINTS I AND II OF PLAINTIFFS' APPEAL BECAUSE THE NOTICE
OF APPEAL WAS NOT TIMELY FILED, AND THE APPEAL ON
_ r APPELLANTS' POINTS I AND II SHOULD BE DISMISSED
It is clear from the plaintiffs' complaint that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
their action
was oneMachine-generated
in unlawful
detainer. Plaintiffs so
OCR, may contain errors.

- 9 state in their appeal brief (Statement of the Kind of Case,
appellants1 brief, p. 1). The notice of appeal was not
filed until 24 days after the judgment in the matter had
been entered.

Chapter 36 of Title 78, Utah Code Annotated,

commonly referred to as the unlawful detainer statute, contains its own time period, ten days, within which a notice
of appeal must be filed.
tated.

Section 78-36-11, Utah Code Anno-

This is the type of shorter time provided by law

referred to in Rule 78 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and which shorter time is applicable to the appeal in this
matter.
The Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this
appeal inasmuch as the notice of appeal was not filed timely
within the time provided in Section 78-36-11.

In Fernandez

v. Purdue, 30 U.2d 389, 518 P.2d 684 (1974), this Court
rendered a short decision on point and which is dispositive
of the issue of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to
hear this appeal:
Defendants appeal from a judgment of the
district court, wherein plaintiff was
awarded damages for the forcible entry,
Sec. 78-36-1, U.C.A. 1953, of defendants
into premises occupied by plaintiff.
- _ j,;.-,
c It

j

The judgment was entered on April 3,
1973, and defendants filed their notice
of appeal from that judgment on April 30,
1973. This appeal was not taken within
ten days, the time provided in Sec. 78-36-11,
U.C.A. 1953. This court is without jurisdiction to entertain the instant appeal.
The appeal is dismissed. No costs
are awarded. (Emphasis added.)
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- 10 Similarly, in Coombs v. Johnson. 26 U.2d 8, 484
P.2d 155 (1971), this Court stated:
Plaintiffs commenced these proceedings in
unlawful detainer in the court below seeking
restitution of certain premises in Salt
Lake County. After a trial upon the issues, °
judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, Roy j.*- ^ D
Johnson and Janice L. Johnson, and in favor
of the defendants Percy Clark and Mrs. Percy
Clark. The judgment was entered on July 1,
1970, and the plaintiffs filed their notice
of appeal from that judgment on July 15, 1970.
It is apparent that the appeal was not taken
within the time prescribed by Sec. 78-36-11,
U«C.A. 1953, and this court is without jurisdiction to entertain it.

*
u

it

l.., 16

"

The appeal in this case is dismissed.
Respondents are entitled to costs. (Footnote
omitted; emphasis added.)
Points I and II of appellants1 brief are appeals
from the lower court's judgment of the unlawful detainer
action.

Count III of Nikols1 counterclaim was not dis-

missed.

That count is a claim for "attorney's fees in

connection with the defense of this action."

Thus, the

claim was not based on Nikols1 other claims in his counterclaim, but on defense of the plaintiffs' unlawful detainer
action.

Plaintiffs' unlawful detainer action is based upon

the lease agreement and alleged violations of said agreement.

In prosecuting their action, plaintiffs asked for and

necessarily had to rely upon the Court's interpretation of
the lease agreement in light of the facts presented at
trial.

There could be no judgment of unlawful detainer
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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- 11 unless the Court held the defendants were in violation of
the provisions of the lease agreement.

The Court's inter-

pretation of the lease as to attorney's fees, as provided in
paragraph 16 of the lease agreement, was proper.
In Brandley v. Lewis, 97 Utah 217, 92 P.2d 338
(1939), the defendant appealed from an adverse judgment in
an unlawful detainer action.

The plaintiff moved for dis-

missal for defendant's failure to appeal timely.

The defen-

dants asserted the action was not in unlawful detainer, but
for declaratory judgment construing a contract.

The Utah

Supreme Court stated the following:

jr

.\

Counsel for appellant then argues in
answer to the motion to dismiss the appeal
that the only point in issue in the cause
was the meaning and effect of paragraph II
of defendant's lease, and therefore the
action was not one in unlawful detainer.
The issues set up in the complaint as outlined above state a cause of action in
\ unlawful detainer. Defendant in effect
raised only one issue thereon, as to whether
or not her lease had terminated. If it had
she would be detaining unlawfully; if not,
plaintiff must fail. Since unlawful detainer
is an action to oust a tenant whose lease
has expired or been terminated (R.S.U. 1933,
Section 104-60-12), it follows that plaintiff must show that defendant's lease has
terminated. In this cause, that termination
depended upon the terms of the contract of
lease. . . . To determine therefore whether
defendant was in unlawful detainer the court
must determine the meaning and effect of the
paragraph, but that does not change the
action from one in unlawful detainer. It
is merely deciding a question the decision
of which is necessary in making a determination
as to whether defendant is in unlawful detainer. . . . The trial court determined
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ICT

the point against defendant and entered
judgment for restitution of the premises
-'^
to plaintiff. From that judgment plaintiff
seeks to appeal. Under the statute (R.S.U. r
1933, Section 104-60-14), the appeal from
such judgment must be taken within 10 days.^3**—
This appeal was not so taken and must therefore be dismissed. Hunsaker v. Harris, 37
Utah 226, 109 P. 1; Murphy v. Paumie, 37
Utah 228, 109 P. 2. (Emphasis added.)

s">:*.:'• Nikols1 claim for attorney's fees was based upon
the unlawful detainer action.

The claim was a compulsory

counterclaim because it "arises out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim . . . ."

Rule 13(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

As such, it was an integral part of the unlawful detainer
action.

Appeal from the judgment based upon the claim is

subject to the time requirements of the unlawful detainer
statute.
The appellants1 second point on appeal is that
"the trial court should have found as a matter of law that
respondents had breached the lease." Appellants' brief, p.
11.

Where the plaintiffs' action was in unlawful detainer,

there can be no dispute that the error claimed by appellants
required filing of the notice of appeal within the ten-day
period.

Appellants do not claim that their action was

anything other than an unlawful detainer action, and an
appeal from the trial court's judgment on the unlawful
detainer claim must be filed within ten days from the date
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- 13 of judgment.

Section 78-36-11, Utah Code Annotated; Fer-

nandez v. Purdue, 30 U.2d 389, 518 P.2d 684 (1974); Coombs
v. Johnson, 26 U.2d 8, 484 P.2d 155 (1971).

This is the

case even if the trial court must construe a written lease
agreement.

Brandley v. Lewis, 97 Utah 217, 92 P.2d 338

(1939).
In summary, the Supreme Court is without jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs1 appeal from a judgment
rendered in an action based upon the unlawful detainer
statute inasmuch as the notice of appeal was not filed
within ten days of the date the judgment was rendered.
Dunbar v. Hansen, 68 Utah 398, 250 Pac. 982
(1926), is inapplicable.

In Dunbar, the Court was presented

with the issue of whether, in a statutory unlawful detainer
action, allegations which would constitute a counterclaim
could be set forth in the unlawful detainer action and heard
at-trial.

There, the Court was relying upon Section 6576 of

the Compiled Laws of Utah 1917, which defined a counterclaim, which section, together with all of the rules of
civil procedure, have been replaced with modern rules of
procedure, including rules regarding compulsory counterclaims.

Rule 13(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

states:

"A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim

which at the time of serving the pleading of the pleader has
against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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- 14 opposing party's claim . . . ." No Utah case has been found
,;"

ft

which defines the phrase "arises out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing partyfs
claim."

Professor Moore has stated that "any claim that is

logically related to another claim that is being sued on is
properly the basis for a compulsory counterclaim; only
claims that are unrelated or are related, but within the
exceptions, need not be pleaded." (Footnotes omitted.)

3

Moore's Federal Practice, 1113.13, pp. 13-300-302. The ' '
purpose of the compulsory counterclaim rule is to avoid
multiplicity of suits by having all logically related claims
involving the same parties, facts or law in a single lawsuit.

The transaction involved is the lease which the

parties executed.

In the plaintiffs1 claim for unlawful

detainer, there were before the Court substantial similarities of facts required to determine the defendants' claim
for attorney's fees.

Under the present rules of procedure,

a compulsory counterclaim must be pleaded or it is barred.
Slim Olson, Inc. v. Winegar, 122 Utah 80, 246 P.2d 608
(1952); 3 Moore's Federal Practice, 13-297.

c

«

i

?

>

That the defendants' counterclaim was compulsory
is shown in several cases where the principal action was
based upon a contract and gave rise to a compulsory counterclaim.

In United States v. Gerbus Bros* Construction Co.,

57 F.R.D. 206 (E.D. Ky. 1972), where a subcontractor brought
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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- 15 an action against the prime contractor and its bonding
company for recovery of value of labor and materials supplied , the general contractor was required to assert its
claim that the subcontractor had breached its contract by
compulsory counterclaim and not in a separate action.

In

Weit v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. of
Chicago, 60 F.R.D. 5 (N.D. 111. 1973), an action by holders
of bank credit cards against banks and merchants for conspiracy and antitrust violations, the Court held that claims
against the cardholders for delinquent accounts was a compulsory counterclaim.

See also James B. Day & Co. v. Reich-

hold Chemicals, Inc., 60 F.R.D. 387 (N.D. 111. 1973).

Where

the rule pertained to counterclaims has been given liberal
construction and the term "transaction" is a word of flexible meaning which may comprehend a series of several occurrences, E. J. Korvette Co. v. Parker Pen Co., 17 F.R.D. 267
(S.D.N.Y. 1955), it is clear that the defendant's claim for
attorney's fees was a compulsory counterclaim, and would
have been barred by res judicata had it not been raised in
the trial court.
Where the counterclaim was compulsory, it became
an integral part of the unlawful detainer action and an
appeal therefrom must be filed within the time prescribed by
the statute.
The summary nature of an unlawful detainer action
is not jeopardized by allowing counterclaims to be included
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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- 16 in the same action when "the court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of
any claim, crossclaim, counterclaim, or third party claim,
or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, third party claims or issues."

Rule

42(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Since the Dunbar case, the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure have been adopted, and create a substantially
different method of procedure, particularly where counterclaims are involved.
In addition, the plaintiffs cannot rely upon the
holding of the Dunbar case inasmuch as no issue was raised
in the trial court concerning whether the counterclaims
could be heard.

It is clear that "matters neither raised in

pleadings nor put in issue at trial cannot be considered for
the first time on appeal."
482 P.2d 702 (1971).

Wagner v. Olsen, 25 U.2d 366,

See also Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson,

29 U.2d 259, 508 P.2d 528 (1973); In re Ekker's Estate, 19
U.2d 414, 432 P.2d 45 (1967); Riter v. Cayias, 19 U.2d 358,
431 P.2d 788 (1967).

See Arnold v. Krigbaum, 146 Pac. 423

(Cal. 1915), cited by the Court in Dunbar where, on plaintiff 's motion, the Court struck the defendant's counterclaim
and refused to allow evidence at trial in support of the
counterclaim.
By not objecting to the defendants' counterclaims
to the unlawful detainer action, even if such objection
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- 17 would have been valid, the plaintiffs waived such objection,
and the counterclaims became part and parcel of the unlawful
detainer action.

ii

„j :;>r,-

,

t>

J,

Weyer v. Peterson, 16 U.2d 278, 399 P.2d 438
(1965) , does not require a different conclusion.

There, the

seller of real estate under a uniform real estate contract
brought an unlawful detainer action for the buyer's failure
to make payments in accordance with the contract or to pay
the past due amounts upon demand.

The defendant appealed

from the dismissal of his claim in equity for the value of
his equity in the premises.

The court infers that had the

appeal been from the judgment of unlawful detainer that the
appeal was not timely made, within the ten days provided by
Section 78-36-11. The implication is that since the appeal
was based upon the defendant's equitable counterclaim, that
he was subject to the general statute concerning time within
which an appeal must be taken.
Where the plaintiffs brought an action in unlawful
detainer, and appealed from judgment therein, they cannot
rely on defendants' counterclaims as providing additional
time within which to file their appeal from the judgment in
unlawful detainer.

Such an appeal is strictly controlled by

the time provided by the statute.

The summary nature of the

unlawful detainer action is for the benefit of landlord and
tenant, not to be disregarded at the landlord's desire.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In

- 18 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, Section 431, pp. 77-78, the rule
is stated as follows:
A particular time or period specifically
prescribed for the taking or perfecting of
an appeal, proceeding in error or the like,
{
- in any particular action or proceeding, or
from or to any particular judgment, order
or decree must be observed in cases falling
within the content and purview of such statute
'-•-* * or rule; such special provisions are not
deemed permissive, giving the party desirous
of review an option between alternative times,
namely, an election between the time thus
specially provided and the time prescribed
by the general provisions, where they differ,
' but are ordinarily designed to secure a prompt
hearing and a final determination in cases
with which they deal, and hence must be complied with. Thus it has been held that the
appeal or proceeding in error or full review
may and must be brought within the time as
limited by the relevant statute or rule of
court, under enactments or rules particularly
? r
"
prescribing the time for appeal . . . .
The appeal period provided in the statute must
prevail over any other time for taking an appeal since the
appeal time is specifically addressed to the unlawful detainer action.

In 4A C.J.S., Appeal and Error, Section 431

at page 82, the following rule is stated:
As between two such special periods, either
of which, if it stood alone, would be capable
''•*>- of applying to a particular situation, that
which points the more directly and specifically
to the case at hand is the one with which the
party appealing must conform; . . . (Footnote
omitted.)
Where the action was primarily one in unlawful detainer, the
specific appeal time provided in the statute must be applied.
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- 19 It is obviously not appropriate to have two appeal
times applicable to an appeal, or different claims in a
single action.

Where plaintiffs' primary action was in

unlawful detainer, they are bound by the appeal time provided in the statute.

Since there is a shortened time pro-

vided by law, it applies to all claims in the case, not just
one.
In summary, plaintiffs' appeal from the judgment
of the unlawful detainer action, as set forth in Points I
and II of their appeal brief, is subject to the appeal time
provided in the unlawful detainer statute.

The plaintiffs'

failure to timely appeal is a jurisdictional bar to any proceedings before the Supreme Court.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS BASED UPON THE DOCTRINES OF
RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
In a prior action commenced by the plaintiffs
against the same defendants in the Third Judicial District
in and for the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, the
plaintiffs claimed and alleged certain breaches of the
lease, which allegations of breaches were substantially
repeated in the subsequent complaint filed in the present
action.

Those allegations which were pleaded in the first

action and alleged again in the second action were that the
defendant Nikols had allowed liens to be placed against the
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- 20 premises without discharge, that the defendants required
club members to pay a cover charge for use of the restaurant
facilities, that the defendants refused to allow minor
members of the club to use the restaurant facilities, that
the defendants failed to provide the same types and qualities of food and service as previously supplied to members,
and that the defendants failed to operate the leased premises as a public restaurant, all allegedly in violation of
the lease agreement.
The trial court granted judgment to the defendants
in this prior action.

Subsequently, the plaintiffs com-

menced the present action and pleaded the same causes of
action as those adjudicated in the prior action.
This Court has previously stated in In re

Town

of West Jordan, 7 U.2d 393, 326 P.2d 105 (1958) at 107:
. . . In the ordinary case where a judgment has been granted on issues which have
been litigated between the same parties,
such issues under the doctrine of collateral
estoppel cannot be relitigated in a subsequent but different cause of action.
In the West Jordan case, the Court found that the action was
based on a new ordinance which necessarily required the
determination of different facts from those determined in
the previous action, and therefore that the doctrine of
collateral estoppel was not applicable.

t

In Knight v. Flat Top Mining Co., 6 U.2d 51, 305
P.2d 503 (1957), the Court held that where mining claimants
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- 21 had an opportunity to defend the title to their claims in a
prior case and failed to do so, they were precluded from
relitigating their claims in a subsequent case where the
rights of the same parties or their successors in interest
are concerned.

This Court, citing 30 Am.Jur. 920, §178,

Judgments, stated:

-

i;

It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that material facts or questions
which were in issue in a former action,
and were there admitted or judicially
determined, are conclusively settled by
a judgment rendered therein, and that
such facts or questions become res judicata and may not be litigated in a subsequent action between the same parties
or their privies, regardless of the form
the issue may take in a subsequent action
The general rule of collateral estoppel is stated

in Judgments, 46 Am.Jur.2d 583, §415, as follows:
A party may be precluded under the doctrine
of collateral estoppel from attempting a
second time to prove a fact that he sought
unsuccessfully to prove in a prior action.
The rule precluding a relitigation
of facts or questions formerly in issue
applies whether the issue decided in the
earlier action was presented as a grant
of recovery or as a defense, or whether
the issue was decided in the earlier action
..... in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant,
and even though the subsequent action is
a different form of proceeding, is upon a
different cause of action, and involves a
v> .. different subject matter, claim, demand,
than the earlier action. (Footnotes omitted.)
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- 22 The doctrine of collateral estoppel is accepted in
other jurisdictions.

The case of In re Crowe, 483 P.2d 1206

(Cal. 1971), where the Court stated the following at 1213,
is illustrative:

l

!

' '

M

.

^ ^ ,- £

In its aspect of collateral estoppel, res
judicata also postulates that any issue
necessarily decided in civil litigation 3i
is conclusively determined as to the parties or their privies if it is involved
in a subsequent lawsuit on a different
cause of action.

_r

In Gessel v. Jones, 427 P.2d 295 (Mont. 1967), in
holding that a judicial determination concerning child
support estops a relitigation of the issue of the amount of
child support, notwithstanding a contrary contractual arrangement between the parties, the Court stated:
The bar that arises from collateral
^
estoppel extends to all questions essen- J
tial to the judgment and actually deter.; mined by a prior judgment.

f
ni

Similarly, in Wharton v. Zenger, 186 P.2d 287
(Kan. 1947), the Court stated at 291:

.''V! *"

This court has always held that where a
court has jurisdiction of the subject
matter of an action and has jurisdiction
of all the parties thereto, its orders
and judgments as to all matters involved
therein are final and conclusive unless
corrected or modified on appeal, and
that such matters cannot again be litigated by the parties to that action or
their privies, in the same court or any
other court of concurrent jurisdiction
upon either the same or different cause
of action.
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- 23 In the instant matter before this Court, the
plaintiffs have alleged the same breaches as those alleged
in their complaint in Civil No. 219945, and in asserting
those alleged breaches generally relied upon precisely the
same language of the complaint in the prior matter.

Inas-

much as the Court held as a matter of law that the plaintiffs had waived such breaches by the acceptance of rent,
the plaintiffs should be estopped from asserting the same
breaches in this matter.

To fail to do so would render the

determination of the Court concerning the facts of the prior
matter of no effect.
The plaintiffs may not challenge the prior determination of the Court in a subsequent action.

The judgment

can only be challenged on appeal of the case in which it is
rendered, not in a subsequent action where the claims are
identical.

Thus, the plaintiffs have lost the opportunity

to appeal the judgment of the Court, and such failure cannot
be corrected by filing another action, as plaintiffs have
attempted to do here.
Only the allegations of paragraphs 8 and 9 of
plaintiffs1 complaint in the present action were not treated
in the prior action.

The allegations in these paragraphs

are also barred inasmuch as any action or occurrence upon
which the allegations were based occurred prior to the
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- 24 payment of rent by defendant and its acceptance by plaintiffs.

The waiver of the alleged breaches by plaintiff is a

permanent waiver.

Having full knowledge of alleged breaches

and subsequently accepting rent under the lease effectively
waives any rights which the plaintiffs may have had in an
action for breach under the lease. _<>
In Port of Walla Walla v. Sunglow Producers, Inc.,
504 P.2d 324 (Wash.App. 1972), the Court found that certain
alleged breaches of the lease were waived by the lessor by
acceptance of rent after the occurrence of breaches and
lessor's knowledge of the breaches.

The lease required the

lessee to submit annual financial statements to the lessor.
After the first year of the lease the lessor made no requests for the financial reports, and the Court held that by
accepting the rent after the breach, the lessor had waived
its claim for forfeiture.

The lease also provided that

should the lessee be adjudicated a bankrupt, the lessor
could, at its option, without notice, terminate the lease
and immediately take possession of the premises.
stated:

*

The Court

- ,

Although the lease in question made
lessee's bankruptcy a ground for forfeiture, the [lessor's] non-action and
acceptance of rentals (since the bank(

ruptcy was not a continuing breach)
waived the default and continued the
lease in effect.
r.
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- 25 In Signal Oil Co. v. Stebick, 245 P.2d 217 (Wash.
1952), the Court held that the acceptance of rent by the
lessor constituted a waiver of the lessee's breach that the
premises be used for an automobile sales business. The
premises had in fact not been used for an automobile sales
business for three or four years prior to the trial of the
matter, and rent had been accepted during such time.
The Courts of California concur with the proposition that acceptance of rent waives breaches known by the
lessor.

In Group Property/ Inc. v. Bruce, 348 P.2d 761 (4th

Dist./ Cal./ 1952)/ the Court held that the defendant had
waived the breach of the lessee, the breach being failure to
make improvements on the structure as required in the lease,
and that the plaintiff was entitled to specific performance
of the defendant under an option to purchase the property
which had been exercised by the plaintiff.

In reaching its

conclusion/ the Court cited the Supreme Court of the State
of California:

,

_

r

In Kern Sunset Oil Co. v. Good Roads
Oil Co., 214 Cal. 435f 6 P.2d 71/ 80
A.L.R. 453/ the lease provided that
lessee should drill two wells each year
until six wells had been drilled. Up
to that time it had drilled only 13
wells. For nearly five years, lessor,
with full knowledge of the facts, accepted the regular monthly royalty payments without complaint. Later/ a
notice of breach of the terms of the
lease was served and royalties were
thereafter accepted. The court held
that under these facts, the lessor
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; r

waived the breach of the leases and
said (quoting from the syllabus):
"The theory upon which the court held
that acceptance of rent after the breach
of the covenants of the lease, with
knowledge of all the facts surrounding
such breach, constitutes a waiver of
such breach, is that by acceptance of
the rent under these circumstances, the
lessor recognizes the existence of the
lease and that it is inconsistent and
not permissible for a party to recognize the existence of a lease and accept
benefits under it and at the same time
claim that it is forfeited, and seek to
recover the fruits of the forfeiture."
In Julian v. Gossner, 229 P.2d 786 (3d Dist.,

Cal., 1951), the Court held that the lessee's breach of the
covenant not to sublease without lessor's consent was waived
by acceptance of rent by lessor after knowledge of the
sublease.

Similarly, in Bedford Ind. Co. v. Fobe, 180 P.2d

361 (2d Dist. Cal., 1947), the Court stated at 363:
^
r , » tt ij

The right of the lessor to declare a for- '•
feiture of a lease by reason of the making
of a sublease without the lessor's consent
in violation of the lease is waived when
the lessor, after knowledge of the sublease, accepts the rent specified in the
lease.
In each of the foregoing cases, the Court held

that acceptance of rent was a waiver of alleged breaches of
the contract, including breaches of improper use of the premises, subleasing the premises without the lessor's consent,
adjudication of bankruptcy, failure to provide accounting
statements, and that the waiver of the breaches acted as a
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- 27 bar to an action for forfeiture of the lease. The district
court held in the prior action that the plaintiffs had
waived the breaches alleged in their complaint by acceptance
of the rent.

That determination is res judicata on the

issue, and the waiver is permanent and the plaintiffs should
be estopped from asserting the same breaches in this matter.
POINT III
THE PLAINTIFFS1 NOTICE TO CURE DEFAULT OR QUIT AND
NOTICE TO QUIT ARE DEFECTIVE AND INADEQUATE TO
SUPPORT AN ACTION IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER
The trial court erred in denying the defendants'
Motion to Dismiss based upon defective notices served by
plaintiffs upon the defendants.

Section 78-36-3(5), U.C.A.,

provides that a tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer:
[W]hen he continues in possession, in
person or by subtenant, after the neglect
or failure to perform any condition or
covenant of the lease or agreement under
which the property is held . . . and after
notice in writing requiring in the alternative the performance of such conditions or
covenant or the surrender of the property
. . . Within three days after the service of the notice, the tenant, or any
subtenant in actual occupation of the premises . . . may perform such condition or
covenant and thereby save the lease from
forfeiture.
The obvious purpose of this section is to provide notice to
the tenant allegedly in default of the lease, notifying the
tenant of the breaches which the lessor claims have occurred,
and to provide three days for performing the condition or
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- 28 covenants of the lease. For this provision to be effective,
the lessor must give notice to the lessor which is coherent,
understandable, and by which the tenant may identify the
acts or circumstances which constitute the alleged violation
of covenants or conditions.
In American Holding Co. v. Hanson, 23 U.2d 432,
464 P.2d 592, the lessor's notice stated that for failure to
pay rent and to pay utility bills, the lessees were to quit
the premises and deliver up possession within 15 days.

The

Supreme Court of Utah held that the notice was defective in
that the lessees were not given notice of their alternative
right to pay rent and to pay the utility bills.

This case

indicates the importance of specifying the lessee's right to
cure conditions and covenants which the lessor claims are in
default.
In Van Zyverden v. Farrar, 15 U.2d 367, 393 P.2d
468 (1964), this Court stated:
Unlawful detainer statutes provide a
severe remedy and must be strictly complied with before the cause of action
thereon may be maintained.
It was held that proper notice had not been given and was
required as a condition precedent to maintaining an action
in unlawful detainer.

'

*

In Callister v. Spencer, 113 Utah 497, 196 P.2d
714 (1948), the Court was presented with a notice specifically setting forth the acts and circumstances which the
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- 29 lessor claims were violations of the lease agreement.

The

type of notice in that case is the type contemplated by
Section 78-36-3(5), U.C.A.
The notice which was served upon the defendants is
extremely general and does not state with the required
specificity the acts and circumstances which are allegedly
in violation of the lease agreement.
The Notice to Cure Default or Quit (Ex. 5-P),
specified seven violations of the lease agreement:
1. You have not provided the same
types and qualities of food and service
previously supplied members.

* °*

2. You have failed to operate the
premises as a public restaurant.
3. You have required Towne House
members to pay a cover charge for the use
of the restaurant facilities.
4. You have refused to allow minor
members of the Towne House to use the
premises described in the Sublease.
5. You have failed to keep the dining
room open during the required periods.
6. You have failed to operate the
restaurant in accordance with law by allowing loud, boisterous and objectionable
entertainment.
7. You have allowed liens to be
placed against the premises and have failed
to remove the same.
Each of the above points is discussed in order.
Plaintiffs state in their Notice that the defendants have not provided the same types and qualities of food
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- 30 service previously supplied members.

The Notice in no way

indicates in what respects or what way the food and service
were not appropriate.

The Notice does not sufficiently

inform the defendant of the nature of the claimed deficiency
in quality and service, and thus it would be impossible for
the defendants to undertake a good faith effort to correct
the alleged defect.

In short, the notice does not ade-

quately inform the defendants to allow them to cure the
defects.

..,

^

.,.••,••

The second complaint is that the defendants failed
to operate the premises as a public restaurant.

Reference

is made to Section V . B of this brief dealing with the definition of "public" and "public place."

This claimed defect

is similar to the previous o n e in that the notice does n o t
specify the alleged breach in such a w a y that it m a y b e
cured within the time specified by the unlawful detainer
statute.
The third complaint is that defendants required
Towne House members to pay a cover charge for the u s e of the
restaurant facilities.

Reference is made to Section V . E in

connection with a cover charge as a breach of the lease.
The plaintiffs' Notice states the defendants
refused to allow minor members of the Towne House to u s e the
premises.

Reference is made to Section V . C of this brief in

connection with this alleged breach.
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- 31 Plaintiffs' Notice alleges the defendants failed
to keep the dining room open during the required period.
The lease provides a rather specific statement of the time
the defendants are required to operate the dining room.
However, again it is incumbent upon the plaintiffs to specify the manner in which the lease is not complied with and,
therefore, to specify the time or times claimed by plaintiffs that the dining room is not open as required.

Only

then can the defendants assess and determine whether they
are in fact in breach of the terms of the lease agreement.
The plaintiffs' claim in their notice that defendants failed to operate the restaurant in accordance with
law by allowing loud, boisterous and objectionable entertainment must also fail inasmuch as the plaintiffs have
failed to notify the defendants of the laws which were
allegedly violated.

Nor do the plaintiffs state in what

manner or degree the entertainment is loud, boisterous or
objectionable.

In short, like the other claimed breaches,

the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently describe them to allow
the plaintiffs to alter the conduct or circumstances to
comply with the provisions of the lease, if required.
Finally, as to the defendant's alleged failure to
remove liens and allowing liens to be filed against the
premises, the notice does not specify the liens which allegedly were allowed to be placed against the premises.
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- 32 is not even clear that such liens, if any, were the responsibility of the defendants or that they would have any legal
obligation to remove such liens. Again, the notice fails to
specify the manner in which the alleged defect could be
cured within the time specified by the unlawful detainer
statute.
Upon receipt of the Notice to Cure Default or Quit
and the Notice to Quit, the defendants were not and would
not have been able to determine the claimed violations of
the lease.

Only through the discovery process and trial

were the defendants able to determine the specific acts
which the plaintiffs claimed were in violation of the lease.
This is not the kind of notice which is contemplated by the
unlawful detainer statute, and such notice as was served
upon the defendants, as a matter of law, is defective and
cannot support an action in unlawful detainer.
POINT IV
*

THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO
DEFENDANT NIKOLS WAS PROPER

A. The Lease Agreement Provides for Award of
Attorney's Fees.
Paragraph 16 of the lease agreement provides for
attorney's fees "which may arise or accrue from enforcing
this lease or in obtaining possession of the premises or in
pursuing any remedy provided by the laws of the State of
Utah, whether by filing a suit or otherwise."

In defending
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- 33 the action brought by the plaintiffs, the defendants were
merely attempting to enforce the lease and were pursuing a
remedy provided by the laws of the State of Utah.

Clearly,

the meaning of the provision providing for costs and attorney's fees includes the defense of an action to remove the
defendants from the premises.
This Court, in D & R Supply Co. v. Bringhurst, 28
U.2d 442, 503 P.2d 1216 (1972), and Spanish Fork Packing Co.
v. House of Fine Meats, Inc., 29 U.2d 312, 508 P.2d 1186
(1973), stated that the elementary principles of contract
law are to be applied in determining the existence of and
construing an agreement to pay attorney's fees.

Certainly

the principle of mutuality of agreement and obligation must
exist in a provision to pay attorney's fees as was contemplated by the parties to the lease agreement in the present
case.

The interpretation given the provision for attorney's

fees by the plaintiff would allow him to bring suit against
the defendants with impunity.

So long as defendants were

not granted judgment against the plaintiff for default of
the lease agreement, plaintiff would have no risk of being
obligated to pay defendant's costs and attorney's fees for
defending actions brought against them.

Such cannot be

construed to have been the meaning of the provision in the
lease agreement or the intent of the parties in providing
for attorney's fees.

The contractual element of mutuality

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 34 of agreement requires that award of attorney's fees would be
included in the case before the Court.

The trial court's

award of attorney's fees to defendant Nikols should be
affirmed on the language of the lease agreement and such
principles of contract law.
B. When the Trial Court Specifically Dismissed
Plaintiffs' Complaint Against Defendants, No Cause of Action,
the Court Should Have Found as a Matter of Law that the
Plaintiffs Had Breached the Covenant of Quiet and Peaceful
Possession.
Paragraph 11 of the lease agreement provides:
"Sublessor covenants that as long as sublessee is not in
default under this sublease, he shall quietly and peaceably
hold the premises."

It has been held that prosecution of

forceable entry and detainer actions and service of notices
to quit upon a tenant constitute violation of the covenant
of quiet enjoyment.

In Kuiken v. Garrett, 51 N.W.2d 149, 41

A.L.R.2d 1397 (Iowa, 1952), the Supreme Court of Iowa, in an
action for breach of the implied covenant for quiet enjoyment, stated the following:
' '' *"
!

-^

*:

nr^*.

We hold that it is not always that a tenant
in possession can be denied the right to
damages because he remains upon the realty;
but that if the landlord harasses and annoys
him and disturbs his quiet enjoyment, by
a systematic course of oppression or interference, just compensation may be required.
This is true even though the tenant's action
is founded, as we think it is here, on contract rather than in tort.

The Supreme Court of Iowa also allowed attorney's fees, even
in absence of a written agreement therefor, caused by a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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- 35 wrongful interference with the tenant's right of quiet
enjoyment.
-

In the present case, the plaintiff served two

notices and filed a suit in a prior action against defendant
Nikols.

When a summary judgment was awarded in favor of the

defendants and against the plaintiffs, a second action,
preceded by two notices, was filed by the plaintiffs against
the same defendants.

Under these circumstances, as in

Kuiken, the lessor has breached the covenant of quiet enjoyment, and the defendants were entitled to judgment as a
matter of law, including the award of attorney's fees.
In Hubble v. Cole, 13 S.E. 1441 (Va., 1891), a
tenant brought action against his lessor for unlawfully
being restrained from the use of the premises.

The Court

held that the action was properly brought, that the plaintiff's remedy was not exclusively upon the bond, and that
the dissolution of the injunction was conclusive that the
lessor's action was initiated without sufficient cause, for
which the lessor would be responsible in damages.

In the

present case, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's
complaint, no cause of action, and the defendants were entitled to a judgment that the covenant of quiet enjoyment
had been breached.
Where the plaintiffs had instituted a second
action predicated upon the unlawful detainer statute, preceded by
a Notice to Cure Default or Quit and a Notice to
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- 36 Quit served upon the defendants, and which action contained
alleged breaches pleaded in the prior action, the trial
court should have found as a matter of law that the plaintiffs had breached the covenant of quiet enjoyment. .•.,-•,
-...,,.*

v

POINT V r

;<•--*,

ANY CHANGE IN THE OPERATION OF THE LEASED
PREMISES WAS NOT A BREACH OF THE LEASE

",i 9 D

Two provisions of the lease are pertinent to this
issue.

Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the lease provide:

4. Use of Premises. Heretofore Sublessor has prepared and served food and
beverages on the above-described premises
^ ,y]. . in operating the Towne House Athletic Club ,
thereon. Sublessee assumes the operation
* :.* . of preparing and serving such food and
beverages to the members of the said Club
in the main dining room and kitchen area.
Sublessee shall have such use of the pre° mises as shall be reasonable and desirable
to facilitate the preparation and dispensing
_
of such foods and beverages. Sublessee
:
shall use said premises strictly in accord
with all applicable federal, state and
local laws, rules and ordinances.

::l

f

5. Scope of Operation. Sublessee
shall have available and prepare and
serve to members of the said Club on
the premises food and beverages in the
^
types and qualities presently being
served and shall serve the same on the
days and hours when the same are pre. 1 sently available. Food and beverages
.,
are served on the days and at the times
as follows: ,
•r ,
Lunch

. ,n

4

Dinner ' "
, , ,-n

Monday through Friday
11:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m.
Saturday
- 3 0 P-m-

7

to
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- 37 In addition, Sublessee shall have sandwiches
and drinks available Monday through Saturday
from 6:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.
Sublessee may offer additional service as he, in his sole discretion, shall
determine.
A. The Required Food Was Available at All Required Times.
The defendant George Anagnostakis testified that
dinner was available between 7:30 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. on
Saturdays, that sandwiches and drinks are available Monday
through Saturday from 6:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., and that in
addition, dinner is available on weeknights from 8:00 until
11:00, and dinner is also available Friday and Saturday from
8:00 until 12:00 (R. 187-8).

Not only are these times

consistent with the times provided in paragraph 5 of the
lease, but dinner is available during the weeknights, which
is not required by paragraph 5 of the lease agreement.
Certainly this is consistent with the provision of paragraph
5 which states:

"Sublessee may offer additional service as

he, in his sole discretion, shall determine."

There is no

evidence that food was not served as required by the lease.
The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants
failed to serve the types and qualities of food required by
the lease. No evidence was introduced that the quality of
food served by the defendants was not in accordance with the
requirements of the lease.

Plaintiffs seem to assert that

if the defendants failed to offer the number of salads and
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- 38 entrees offered by plaintiff, that the defendants are not
offering the "types" of food required by the lease.

There

i

is nothing in the lease which lends any support to such a
construction, and the word "type" cannot be construed to

I

mean "variety" and "quantity" as plaintiffs attempt to
attribute to the word.

]

r

B. In Absence of Specific Limitation in the
Lease, a Tenant May Use the Premises for Whatever Lawful
Purpose He Desires.
A provision in a lease authorizing the use of the

.
'
I

premises for a specified purpose is generally regarded as
permissive rather than restrictive, and does not limit the

J

use of the premises by the lessee to such purpose nor forbid

.

that they be used for a similar lawful purpose which is not

•

injurious to the landlord's rights or not otherwise expressly

I

forbidden.

In Beck v. Giordano, 356 P.2d 264 (Colo. 1960),

the Colorado Supreme Court was requested to construe a

I

provision of the lease regarding use of the premises "to
occupy the same as a restaurant".

The defendant had per-

mitted a fireworks stand to be operated on the premises for
a short period of time.

•
I

The Court held that the defendant's

act was not specifically prohibited, and therefore did not

I

constitute a breach of the lease.
A lease agreement may impose restrictions as to
the use of the leased property upon the tenant.

However,

I
l

such restrictions, to be valid, must be express provisions.
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- 39 The lease between the plaintiffs and defendant Nick N.
Nikols contains no specific restriction which can be construed to limit the use of the premises to a restaurant
only/ with no other use permitted.

On the contrary, the

lease contains permissive language in connection with the
preparation and dispensing of foods.
Inasmuch as the lease contains no provisions which
limit or restrict the use of the premises by the defendantsf
so long as food is served as provided in paragraphs 4 and 5
of the lease, the premises

may be used for any reasonable,

lawful purpose.
Thus, the points made in paragraphs 13, 14, 16, 17
and 18 of plaintiffs' Statement of Facts are irrelevant and
immaterial, and plaintiffs1 argument that changing the
operation of the restaurant constituted a breach of the
lease as a matter of law is contrary to the law cited above.
Counsel for plaintiff cites no authority which states that a
change or expansion of a business or service constitutes a
breach of a lease in absence of a provision restricting the
operation of the premises to a particular business or purpose,

-s-f -»-*: -•-..•

* ~

..*... <w.. ..-...,-. ,,„,^

There was no evidence that the defendants had
failed to provide the types and qualities of food which had
been served by the plaintiff.
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- 40 C. There Was No Evidence That the Defendants Ever
Refused Food Service
or Entry of a Member of the Salt Lake
Athletic Club. v ^ , , .
c
•.. -/-„..
... *
Counsel for the plaintiffs attempts to make defendant Aggie's possession of a Class "C" beer license extremely significant.

There is no dispute that the Class "C"

beer license makes it unlawful for the licensee to permit
any person under the age of 21 years to remain in or about
the licensed premises.

There is further no contention that

the defendant Aggie ever violated the ordinance.

In para-

graph 2 of plaintiffs' Statement of Facts, brief of plaintiffsappellants , the plaintiffs state the number of members of
the Salt Lake Athletic Club, including memberships issued to
minors.

The Court sustained the defendants' objection that

the plaintiff Ted Stevensen's testimony was not the best
evidence of the types of memberships and their rights,
including the facilities available to them.

There was no

evidence before the Court that any minor person was a member
of the Salt Lake Athletic Club.

L

•'v

Paragraph 5 of the lease agreement refers to
members of the Club, not to their guests or families or
children.

The defendants are not parties to the house rules

of the Salt Lake Athletic Club (Ex. 19-P), nor are they
bound by it.

It was not made a part of nor even referred to

in the lease agreement.

.

-

Not only do the plaintiffs fail to prove there is
such a thing as a minor member of the Club, but also fail to
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- 41 establish in what way the excluding of a minor person from
the premises licensed as a Class "C" beer license is in
violation of the lease agreement.

In paragraph 4 of the

lease agreement, the defendants covenant to comply with the
applicable federal, state and local laws, rules and ordinances.

Clearly, to allow a minor to enter into the pre-

mises would be a violation of that provision of the lease.
In summary, plaintiffs have failed to establish a
violation of the lease, and defendants have shown that their
operation is in accordance with applicable ordinances.
D. The Premises Were Operated as a Public Restaurant Consistent with the Terms of the Lease.
Section 20-14-1 of the Salt Lake City Ordinances
defines restaurant as "any place where food or drink is prepared, served or offered for sale or sold for human consumption on or off the premises."

It is uncontradicted that

Aggie has such a license (Ex. 10-P), and is thus duly licensed to transact business within Salt Lake City.

The

plaintiffs attempt to define restaurant in terms of the Salt
Lake City Zoning Ordinances, but do not make any claim that
a restaurant in the premises is in violation of the ordinance.

Thus, such a definition is only meaningful to the

zoning ordinance and the zones in which a restaurant is
authorized to be operated.

The cases cited by plaintiff,

Leograndis v. Liquor Control Commission, 149 Conn. 507, 182
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- 42 A.2d 9 (Sup.Ct. Err. 1962), and Fulford v. Board of Zoning
Adjustment of City of Dothan, 256 Ala. 336, 54 A.2d 580
(1951), are inapplicable in that they deal with inapplicable
statutes, and Fulford is a case dealing with violation of
zoning ordinances.
In an attempt to determine the meaning of the word
"public," note may first be made of the difficulty of defining the term.

In 73 C.J.S. at 274-5, it is stated:

It has been said that the word "public"
is familiar to everyone. However, it is
a term of most varied and indefinite
connotation, a convertible term, and
it does not have a fixed or definite
meaning.
Among the definitions of "public" in this section, are found
the following:

- r:-

"Public" is also defined or employed as
meaning the inhabitants of a particular
place; all the inhabitants of a particular place; the people of the neighborhood; a particular body or section of the
people; often, specifically, a clientele.
(Footnotes omitted.)

C'

And at 73 C.J.S. 276:

1

'

Thus, in certain situations the word
"public" means operated for the benefit
of the public, rather than for the bene"' fit of a private individual; but the
term may mean open for the use, enjoyment, and participation of the public
generally, even though a fee is charged,
as, a public dance hall, a public car- rier, etc. (Footnotes omitted.)

In 70 C.J.S. at 1095-6, the term "public place" is defined:
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- 43 As applied to an enclosure/ room or
building, a "public place" must be considered as one wherein, by general invitation , members of the public attend
for reasons of business, entertainment,
instruction, or the like, and are welcome as long as they conform to what is
customarily done there. (Footnote omitted,)
The decisions of several courts shed light on the
definition of "public" and "public place".

In Peachey v.

Boswell, 167 N.E.2d 48, 89 A.L.R.2d 801 (Ind. 1960), the
Court was asked to determine whether a business which utilized a certain type of pinball machine was in violation of
anti-gambling statutes of the State of Indiana.

The statute

in question included the definition of professional gambling
as "maintaining . . . pinball machines which award anything
other than an immediate and unrecorded right of replay . . .
in any place accessible to the public; . . . "
added.)

(Emphasis

After referring to Webster's definitions of "ac-

cessible" and "public", the Court stated:
A place may be accessible to the public
for gambling notwithstanding that every
person who desires is not permitted
access thereto. Lockhart v. State,
(1853) 10 Tex. 275, 276.
It has also been held in a case
involving a prohibition law that by
"public" is meant that the public is
invited to come to the place and has
access to it for the purpose within
the scope of the business there maintained. Brooks v. State (1916), 19
Ga.App. 3, 90 S.E. 989, 991.
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- 44 From a consideration of the terms
"accessible," "public" and "public place,"
as defined hereinabove, together with the
purpose of the act, we have concluded that
the phrase "in any place accessible to the
public . . . " means any place where the
public is invited and are free to go
upon special or implied invitation —
a place available to all or to a certain
segment of the public.
In Askew v. Parker, 312 P.2d 342 (Cal. Ct. of
App., 4th Dist., 1957), the question before the Court was
whether a swimming pool is a "public swimming pool" within
the meaning of the Health and Safety Code of the State of
California where the owner of the pool:

ic

.•:.,.- , :: s

. . . sent out about 300 to 400 general
written invitations, by mail, to all post
office box holders and RFD box holders,
through the U.S. Post Office at Valley
Center, to all the teenaged children in
that community to use the pool free of
charge. Over 100 of these children registered to use the pool. During the summer
session of 1955, it was used by 40 to 60
of these children every day except Saturdays and Sundays. The pool was fenced and
no persons were admitted except those who
could qualify under the general invitations sent out.

The Court held that the pool was a public swimming pool
within the meaning of the statute.

It is clear that re-

stricting the use of a place to certain persons or classes
of persons does not eliminate such a place as being "public"
See also Mary Pickford Co. v. Bayly Bros., 86 P.2d
102, (Cal. 1939).
Finally, in Ginter v. Commonwealth, 262 S.W.2d 178
(Ct. of App., Ken., 1953), the appellant challenged his
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- 45 conviction of intoxication in a public place on the basis
that the alleged drunkenness did not occur in a public place
within the meaning of the statute.

The Court held that "a

combined beer tavern and restaurant is a public place"
without further comment.
E. The "Cover Charge" is not in Violation of the
Lease Agreement.
Inasmuch as the defendants are entitled to add
services and otherwise enlarge upon the business they conduct in the premises (see Sections V.A and V.B of this brief
above), the fact that a charge is made for such additional
services or merely as a means of securing payment for services offered does not constitute a violation of the lease
agreement.
POINT VI
THE ALLEGED BREACHES CLAIMED BY PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT
SUFFICIENT TO RESULT IN A FORFEITURE OF THE
DEFENDANTS1 LEASE AGREEMENT
Provisions for forfeitures in contracts and leases
are not favored in law or in equity and are strictly construed against the party seeking to invoke forfeiture.

In

Chopot v. Foster, 318 P.2d 976 (Wash. 1957), the Supreme
Court of Washington found that there was no evidence of a
violation of the provision of a lease that the lease "shall
not be assigned to any other person without a written consent of the lessor."

The Court went beyond the evidence

question and stated:

"An assignment will not work a for-

feiture without a forfeiture provision in the lease itself,
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- 46 and this lease contains none."

In support of its conclu-

sion, the Court cited 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, Section 104(b), pp. 680, 683, as follows:
In general, a tenant cannot be terminated
for breach of covenant by the lessee unless
there is an express provision in the lease
for forfeiture or right of re-entry in such
case.
-

- i\

Similarly, the Supreme Court of Oregon, in Western

Builders & Tractors Parts, Inc. v. Felmley, 391 P.2d 383
(Ore. 1964), stated:
••—

>

,

It is a well-established rule of law that
forfeitures are not favored and, in the
absence of an agreement for forfeiture or
a statute providing therefor, a lessor may
not terminate the lease for breach of a
covenant.

r

The Supreme Court of Colorado, in Murphy v. Traynor,
135 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1943), dealt with the issue of forfeiture
of a lease.

In this case, the lease provided that the

lessee would "not use or permit the said premises to be used
for any purposes prohibited by the laws of the United States
or the State of Colorado, or by the ordinances of the County
of Jefferson, nor for any other purpose than for the purpose
of selling of wine, beer and liquors, for the purpose of a
restaurant, and for the purpose of operating a gasoline
filling station and automobile repair shop."

The lessee was

subsequently convicted of an unlawful sale of liquor to a
minor, which resulted in the revocation of the lessee's
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- 47 liquor license.

The Court noted that "it is a settled

principle of both law and equity that contractual provisions
for forfeitures are looked upon with disfavor . . . and that
this applies with full force to stipulations found in leases
and hence the rule that they are to be strictly construed
against the party seeking to invoke them."

The Court con-

cluded that the conviction of one sale of liquor to a minor
did not justify a forfeiture under the provisions of the
lease.
The lease between appellants and respondent Nikols
has no provision for a forfeiture of the lease upon the
breach of a covenant contained therein.

Paragraph 16 of the

lease agreement provides that for failure to pay rent, suit
for recovery of the leased premises may be instituted.

The

second paragraph of paragraph 16 of the lease provides as
follows:
Sublessor and sublessee agree that
if either defaults in any of the conditions
and terms of this lease, the defaulting
party shall pay all costs and expenses,
including attorney's feesf which may arise
or accrue from enforcing this lease or in
obtaining possession of the premises or
in pursuing any remedy provided by the
laws of the State of Utah, whether by
filing suit or otherwise.
There is no express provision herein that a default in any
of the conditions or terms of the lease shall result in a
forfeiture of the lease, and therefore there can be no forfeiture.

See Beck v. Giordano, 356 P.2d 264 (Colo. 1960).
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• CONCLUSION :

The plaintiffs' appeal should be dismissed because
it was not timely taken from the judgment of the trial
C O U r t .

.

^ -.,

./L:n,'.-•••

,....': .'

' • ••;•'..••:-• P. c - . z

.-..:

If the appeal is not dismissed, the trial court

should be affirmed in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint and
awarding defendant Nikols attorney's fees.

The record

clearly shows that the trial court's judgment was warranted
and supported by the evidence.
The trial court erred in not dismissing plaintiffs' complaint upon the defendants' motion to dismiss the
complaint as barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel,
and defective notices.
In any event, plaintiffs' evidence failed to
establish that the lease had been breached to a degree, if
it had been breached at all, to result in a forfeiture.
The appeal should be dismissed, the judgment
affirmed, or the judgment should be affirmed in part and
reversed as set forth in this brief, and defendant Nikols
should be awarded his costs.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of August,

1975.
MOYLE & DRAPER
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Hardin A. Whitney and
Wayne G. Petty
600 Deseret Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents
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- 49 Mailed a copy of the foregoing Reply Brief of
Defendant-Respondent Nikols to the following, postage prepaid, this

18th

day of August, 1975:

James A. Arrowsmith, Esq.
WATKINS & FABER
606 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
F. Alan Fletcher, Esq.
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
79 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

